Michigan Law Review
Volume 72

Issue 8

1974

En Banc Review in Federal Circuit Courts: A Reassessment
Michigan Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Courts Commons

Recommended Citation
Michigan Law Review, En Banc Review in Federal Circuit Courts: A Reassessment, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1637
(1974).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol72/iss8/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

August 1974]

Notes

1637

En Banc Review in Federal Circuit Courts:
A Reassessment
A "sitting en banc"1 is a consideration of a case by all of the
judges of a United States court of appeals. 2 It is an exception to the
1. Literally "en bane'' means "in the bench." BLACK'S LA.w DICI'IONARY 619 (rev,
4th ed. 1968).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1970). The statute provides that "[a] court in bane shall consist
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usual procedure for review under which a case is heard by a panel
of three judges,8 whose decision is deemed to be the decision of the
court of appeals.4 Cases may be initially heard en bane or reviewed
by the entire court after consideration by the three-judge panel.Ii
of all circuit judges in regular active service. A circuit judge of the circuit who has
retired from regular active service shall also be competent to sit as a judge of the court
in bane in the rehearing of a case or controversy if he sat in the court or division at
the original hearing thereof."
Without considering the possibility that retired judges may sit en bane, the size
of the circuit's en bane court is equal to the number of judgeships authorized for the
circuit by Congress. The following table indicates the number of judges presently
authorized for each circuit under 28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (1970):
Circuit
Number of Judges
District of Columbia
9
First
3
Second
9
Third
9
Fourth
7
Fifth
15
Sixth
9
Seventh
8
Eighth
8
Ninth
18
T~th
7
A bill is currently pending that would authorize additional judgeships for the courts
of appeals. s. 2991, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). The bill would increase the number of
judgeships on the First Circuit tr;, four, the Second Circuit to eleven, the Third
Circuit to ten, the Fourth Circuit to nine, the Sixth Circuit to ten, the Seventh Circuit
to nine, and the Tenth Circuit to eight.
3. See FED. R. .APP. P. 35(a). In fiscal year 1973, 730 appeals were heard by threejudge panels of the Sixth Circuit; only 3 cases were reheard en bane during the same
period. Letter from Hon. Harry Phillips, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit, to the Michigan Law Review, Nov. 6, 1973 [hereinafter Phillips
Letter]. Only 2 en bane hearings and I en bane rehearing were held in fiscal year
1973 by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Letter from
Hugh E. Kline, Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, to
the Michigan Law Review, Jan. 7, 1974 [hereinafter Kline Letter]. The Fifth Circuit
heard only 24 appeals en bane during fiscal year 1973. Statement of Hon. John R.
Brown, Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, before the
Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System of the United States
(app.), Sept. 5, 1973, on file with the Michigan Law Review [hereinafter Brown Statem~t].
4. 28 U.S.C. §§ 46(b)•(c) (1970).
5. En bane courts may be convened in three situations. First, an en bane court
may be employed in lieu of a three-judge panel. E.g., Lansdale v. Tyler Junior College,
470 F.2d 659 (5th Cir. 1972); Cisneros v, Corpus Christi Independent School Dist., 467
F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973); United States v. Gustavson,
454 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 925 (1972). Second, an en bane
court may be convened after the case has been heard by a panel but before the panel
has announced a decision. E.g., Manley v. United States, 432 F.2d 1241 (2d Cir. 1970);
United States ex rel. Grays v. Rundle, 428 F,2d 1401 (3d Cir. 1970). Third, an en bane
court may be convened after publication of a panel decision. E.g., United States v.
Bailey, 480 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1973), a/fg. on rehearing 468 F,2d 652 (5th Cir. 1972);
Gallegos v. United States, 476 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1973), remanding on rehearing 466
F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1972). The first situation is referred to as an en bane "hearing"; the
last two situations are referred to as en bane "rehearings." See Maris, Hearing and Rehearing Cases in Banc, 14 F.R.D. 91, 92-96 (1953),
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Prevailing theory justifies the use of the en bane procedure as
promoting intra-circuit uniformity of case law through the overruling
of aberrant panel decisions 6 and as placing a maximum of judicial
authority behind decisions of exceptionally important questions. 7
A desire to conserve judicial resources in an era of staggering judicial
caseloads, however, has prompted several circuit courts to adopt
limiting procedures or criteria for the use of en bane review.8 Most
recently the Second Circuit seemed to question the traditional
theories supporting the en bane procedure.Ii
This Note will examine the validity of the traditional justifications for en bane review, discuss the recent circuit court attempts to
modify the procedure, and suggest possible changes that might make
more effective use of it.
Two sets of factors determine when an en bane court will be
convened. The first consists of federal cases and statutes that define
the general procedural parameters of en bane review. The second
includes the rules and practices evolved by the individual circuits.
In 1948, following the Supreme Court's approval of the power to
sit en bane in Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner,10
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 46(c), which provides:
Cases and controversies shall be heard and determined by a court or
division of not more than three judges, unless a hearing or rehearing
before the court in bane is ordered by a majority of the circuit judges
of the circuit who are in regular active service, A court in bane shall
consist of all circuit judges in regular active service. A circuit judge
of the circuit who has retired from regular active service shall also be
competent to sit as a judge of the court in bane in the rehearing of a
case or controversy if he sat"in the court or division at the original
hearing thereo£.U

The statute plainly does no more than establish a basic procedural
6. See text accompanying notes 46-48 infra.
7, See text accompanying notes 61-67 infra.
8, See text accompanying notes 79-88 infra,
9, See Eisen v. Carlisle &: Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), Tevd. on other
grounds, 42 U.S.L.W. 4804 (U.S. May 28, 1974). The Second Circuit refused to grant an
en bane rehearing because the court believed that the Supreme Court would grant
certiorari in the case. 479 F.2d at 1020-21. This would seem to be an abandonment of
the "exceptionally important" rationale for using the en bane procedure. Further
evidence of judicial dissatisfaction with the procedure is found in Judge Mansfield's
concurring opinion in Eisen. He questioned the ability of an en bane court to resolve
intra-circuit disputes. 479 F.2d at 1021.
10. 314 U.S. 326 (1941). The Court looked to congressional history and the Act of
Jan. 13, 1912, ch. 9, § 116, 37 Stat. 52, amending Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 118,
36 Stat. 1132, and interpreted the three-judge provision of the Judicial Code, Act of
March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 117, 36 Stat. 1131, as establishing only a minimum court size
for a formal hearing, and not a limitation on the number of circuit judges who may
hear and decide the case. 314 U.S. at 327-35.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1970).
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framework; substantive guidelines on when to convene en bane are
not stated, and the Supreme Court has held that a circuit court's
exercise of its power to sit en bane is a matter of discretion: "[The
statute] is a grant of power. It vests in the court the power to order
hearing en bane. It goes no further , ... The court [of appeals] is
left free to devise its own administrative machinery to provide the
means whereby a majority may order such a hearing." 12
The Supreme Court, however, could not resist tinkering with
the "machinery,"13 and it required that litigant requests for an en
bane proceeding be considered by at least some of the circuit judges:
"Counsel's suggestion need not require formal action by the court; it
need not be treated as a motion; it is enough if the court simply
gives each litigant an opportunity to call attention to circumstances
in a particular case which might warrant a rehearing en banc."1'
The Court's directive was codified in Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 35(b),15 under which litigants may suggest that a case is
appropriate for an en bane hearing but may not compel members of
the court to give their applications formal consideraton. A vote on
whether to hear a case en bane is taken only if "a judge in regular
active service or a judge who was a member of the panel that rendered a decision sought to be reheard requests a vote on such a
suggestion made by a party.''16
12. Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. 247, 250 (1953),
13. The Supreme Court had stated at length that Congress had vested complete
administrative discretion in the courts of appeals, but it reached out "in exercise of
[its] 'general power to supervise the administration of justice in the federal courts,'"
345 U.S. at 260, quoting United States v. National City Lines, 334 U.S. 573, 589
(1948), to impose "certain fundamental requirements" on the en bane procedure of
the courts of appeals, including a requirement that the circuit courts provide some
administrative machinery to handle litigant petitions.
14. Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. 247, 262 (1953).
15. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure are promulgated under the authority
of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072, 2075 (1970), and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771-72 (1970). These statutes "give
to the Supreme Court power to make rules of practice and procedure for all cases
within the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals." FED. R. APP. P. I, Notes of Advisory
Committee on Appellate Rules (found at 28 U.S.C. 7700, (1970), App.-Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure).
16. FED. R. APP. P. 35(b).
If a party desires to suggest a rehearing in bane the suggestion must be made
within the ume prescribed by Rule 40 for filing a petition for rehearing [14 days]
whether the suggestion is made in such petition or otherwise. The pendency of
such a suggestion whether or not included in a petition for rehearing shall not
affect the finality of the judgment of the court of appeals or stay the issuance
of the mandate.
FED. R. APP. P. 35(c).
Precedent exists that may enable a litigant to convince the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari for the review on substantive grounds of a circuit court's decision to refuse
or to grant an en bane hearing. While the Supreme Court has consistently voiced
deference to circuit court discretion as authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1970), see text accompanying note 12 supra, two arguments exist for allowing review when the circuit
courts fail to follow the policy guidelines of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35.
First, in Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. 247 (1953), the
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The substantive criteria for determining whether to review a
case en bane are thus left to be defined by the rules and practices of
the individual circuits, which also govern the procedural particulars
of en bane review. Substantive guidance is offered, however, by
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35(a), which provides that "a
hearing or rehearing en bane is not favored and ordinarily will not
be ordered except (1) when consideration by the full court is necessary
to secure or maintain uniformity of its decisions, or (2) when the
proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance."
Although Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 35(a) and (b) led
to a decrease in the number of inconsistencies that had existed among
the operational rules of different circuits,17 significant inter-circuit
Supreme Court limited circuit court discretion by requiring the consideration of litigant petitions. See note 13 supra and accompanying text. Although the Court did
not require that the Ninth Circuit hold a rehearing en bane in the case before it,
the "certain fundamental requirements" language that the Court used, see note 13
supra, may be broad enough to reach the Supreme Court's reversal of an en bane
denial. The second argument for allowing review is based on the Supreme Court's
authority to promulgate the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See note 15 supra.
The ultimate power to review interpretations of the rules should lie with the Supreme
Court, and, accordingly, circuit interpretation and implementation of Rule 35(a) may
be subject to Supreme Court scrutiny. Cf. United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216
(1973) (involving FED. R • .APP. P. 58); United States ex Tel. Cerullo v. Follette, 396 U.S.
1232 (1969) (involving FED. R. An. P. 23(b)).
17. Wide variations in circuit court administrative rules mncerning en bane procedures existed prior to the adoption of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35.
(These administrative rules have since been repealed. The old versions may be found
in 28 U.S.C.A., App.-United States Court of Appeals Rules (Supp. 1967), amending
28 U.S.C.A., App.-United States Court of Appeals Rules (1956)). The District of
Columbia, the Fourth, and the Seventh Circuits had no rules dealing with en bane
procedure. The administrative rules of the Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits detailed the procedures for en bane consideration, but they provided no substantive standards for determining when en bane review would be used. 2d Cir. R. 25
(repealed 1968); 3d Cir. R. 4(3) (repealed 1968); 6th Cir. R. 3(1) (repealed 1968); 8th
Cir. R. 4(a), 15(e) (repealed 1968); 9th Cir. R. 23 (repealed 1968). The Tenth Circuit
used en bane as a device to limit appeals of interlocutory orders under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) (1970). It allowed § 1292(b) appeals only with the permission of the entire
coun sitting en bane. 10th Cir. R. 12(b) (repealed 1968). Similarly, the Tenth Circuit
required en bane approval of appeals under § 24 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.
§ 47 (1970). 10th Cir. R. 13(a) (repealed 1968). Only the Fifth Circuit provided general
substantive guidelines for en bane determination:
A majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active service may order that
an appeal or other proceeding be heard or reheard by the court of appeals en bane.
Such a hearing or rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered
except (1) when consideration by the full court is necessary to secure or maintain
uniformity of its decisions, or (2) when the proceeding involves a question of
exceptional importance.
5th Cir. R. 25a (repealed 1968).
Following the promulgation of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35, the
Second, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits rescinded all of their rules on en bane consideration. The remaining circuits J?rovide for the en bane procedure in their rules, but for
the most part the rules duplicate or refer to 28 U.S.C. § 46(e) (1970) and/or Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 35. See D.C. Cm. R. 14; 3D. Cm. R. 2(3); 5TH Cm. R. 12;
6TH Cm. R. 3(b); 7TH Cm. R. 4(b); 8m Cm. R. 2(a); 9TH Cm. R. 12.
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variations remain.18 Nevertheless, it is possible to offer a general
outline of en bane procedure in the eleven circuits.
The general practice is to distribute requests for en bane review
to all active circuit judges, along with whatever supplementary
information it is the practice of the court to provide, and to set a
deadline for the submission of votes.19 Some circuits also circulate
the requests among senior circuit judges and visiting judges.20 The
additional materials that are routinely circulated vary, although
judges are always free to request any available information.21 Some
circuits circulate copies of briefs on file, 22 and opinions (or prospective opinions, when a rehearing en bane is requested subsequent to
18. For example, the role of the three-judge panel in adjudicating requests differs
significantly among the circuits. In the Ninth Circuit the panel recommends whether
or not a case should be reheard en bane. The other judges of the circuit may overrule
the panel decision to grant a rehearing. In Banc Hearings, General Order No. 15,
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 2-5 (rev. May 14, 1969) (herein•
after In Banc Hearings]. In the Fifth Circuit the three-judge panel may grant a
panel rehearing following the receipt of a petition for rehearing, but it does not
formally recommend action on the en bane question. Petitions for Rehearing En Banc
Procedure ("The Pink Slip"), United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 8
au1y 1972). The same procedure is followed in the Second Circuit, but the panel does
not recommend action with respect to the en bane question. If a panel rehearing is
denied, the result of the panel's vote is circulated with the en bane voting forms,
Memorandum to Docket Clerks of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, Processing Petitions for Rehearing and Petitions for Rehearing Containing a
Suggestion that the Action Be Reheard in .Banc 2 (Dec. 4, 1973) (hereinafter Second
Circuit Memorandum]. The Third Circuit has no formal provision for notifying other
court members of the panel's opinion on the suitability of a case for a rehearing. 3d
Cir. Internal Operating P. §§ M-P (rev. March 1, 1974).
19. See, e.g., Second Circuit Memorandum, supra note 18, at l; Telephone Interview
with Richard Windhurst, Deputy Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, New Orleans, La., Feb. 5, 1974 [hereinafter Windhurst Interview]; Telephone
Interview with Robert C. Tucker, Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, St. Louis, Mo., Feb. 5, 1974 (hereinafter Tucker Interview].
20. For example, the Fourth Circuit circulates rehearing requests among the senior
judges who sat on the panel that initially heard the case. Telephone Interview with
William K. Slate, Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
Richmond, Va., Feb. 2, 1974 [hereinafter Slate Interview]. The Eighth Circuit cir•
culates rehearing requests to senior circuit judges and visiting judges who sat on the
original panel. Tucker Interview, supra note 19,
21. Several circuit judges indicated that the trial records of cases under en bane
consideration could be obtained by request, although they are not routinely circulated
in their circuit. E.g., Letter from Hon. Malcolm Richard Wilkey, United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, to the Michigan Law Review, Jan. IO, 1974
(hereinafter Wilkey Letter]; Letter from Hon. Bryan Simpson, United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, to the Michigan Law Review, Oct. I, 1973 (hereinafter Simpson Letter]; Letter from Hon. Luther M. Swygert, Chief Judge, United
States Cou~t of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, to the Michigan Law Review, Oct. 17,
1973 [heremafter Swygert Letter].
22. Slate Interview, supra note 20; Telephone Interview with Robert Hecker
Chief Deputy Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Denver:
Colo., Feb. 5, 1974; Letter from William Luck, Circuit Executive, United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, to the Michigan Law Review, Oct. 28, 1973
(.hereinafter Luck Letter].
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oral argument before a panel but before an opinion has been filed) 28
are often made available.24 Informal personal communication may
of course take place among the judges,211 and a judge who requests
that the court sit en bane may send a justifying memorandum to
the others on the court.26 If a litigant requests an en bane court,
and no judge in regular active service asks for a poll of the court, the
request is summarily denied.27 If a judge initiated the request, or if
a judge requested that a poll be taken in response to a litigant's
request, the judges have a set period in which to vote. Failure to
vote within the alloted time is considered a vote against en bane
consideration.28 If a majority of the active judges on a circuit vote
to rehear a case en bane, litigants may be permitted to file supplementary briefs29 and to reargue orally;30 permission is granted or
·withheld as a matter of course in some circuits,31 while others decide
on a case-by-case basis.82
23. This will ordinarily occur only upon the request of a judge, since it is unlikely
that a litigant would request an en bane rehearing without knowing the outcome of
his appeal before the panel. None of the 256 litigant petitions for en bane rehearings
filed in the Seventh Circuit between September 1, 1969, and August 31, 1973, were
filed after oral arguments but before a formal panel opinion. Swygert Letter, supra
note 21.
24. See Maris, supra note 5, at 93-94. For a four-year period between September
1, 1969, and August 31, 1973, a panel opinion was available in all 256 requests for
rehearings en bane in the Seventh Circuit. Swygert Letter, supra note 21. See also
In Banc Hearings, supra note 18, § 2: "[A] panel should not ordinarily request a rehearing in bane unless and until the members of the panel have first expressed their
views in the form of a proposed opinion or opinions."
Circulation of prospective opinions is a common practice in many of the circuits.
Kline Letter, supra note 3; Letter from Hon. Collins J. Seitz, Chief Judge, United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, to the Michigan Law Review, Oct. 9,
1973 [hereinafter Seitz Letter]; Letter from Hon. John D. Butzner, Jr., United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, to the Michigan Law Review, Oct. 5, 1973
[hereinafter Butzner Letter]; Swygert Letter, supra; Luck Letter, supra note 22.
25. Fifteen of nineteen judges who responded to written requests for information
stated that personal communication is a factor in deciding whether to grant en bane
review. See, e.g., Wilkey Letter, supra note 21; · Letter from Hon. David W. Dyer,
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, to the Michigan Law Review,
Oct. 15, 1973 [hereinafter Dyer Letter]; Letter from Hon. Walter J. Cummings, United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, to the Michigan Law Review, Oct.
15, 1973 [hereinafter Cummings Letter]; Letter from Hon. Donald P. Lay, United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, to the Michigan Law Review, Oct. 2,
1973 [hereinafter Lay Letter].
26. This occurs "on occasion" in the Tenth Circuit. Letter from Tenth Circuit judge
to the Michigan Law Review, Oct. 2, 1973 (name withheld by request).
27. Fm. R. MP. P. 35(b).
28. See, e.g., Second Circuit Memorandum, supra note 18, at 2.
29. This is the practice in the Ninth Circuit. Luck Letter, supra note 22.
30. Oral reargument is allowed in the Seventh Circuit, but not the filing of supplementary briefs. Swygert Letter, supra note 21.
31. The Ninth Circuit always accepts supplementary briefs, Luck Letter, supra
note 22, and the Seventh Circuit never allows supplementary briefs and always allows
oral arguments. Swygert Letter, supra note 21.
32. This is the practice in the Fifth and Sixth Circuits with respect to both
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The major drawback of en bane review is its heavy cost in court
and litigant time and expense. The availability of the procedure
taps the court's resources in three ways. First, litigant suggestions for
a hearing or rehearing en bane necessitate much fruitless consideration of case records by all of the judges of a circuit. In fiscal year
1973, for example, 135 suggestions were filed in the District of
Columbia Circuit; only three suggestions resulted in en bane hearings, but all required the attention of each circuit judge.83 Second,
the grant of an en bane hearing or rehearing considerably lengthens
the time required for the disposition of the case.34 A survey of recent
cases in two circuits revealed that cases reheard en bane take approximately five-and-one-half times longer to reach final decision
than cases heard and disposed of by three-judge panels, and cases
initially heard en bane take approximately two-and-one-half to threeand-one-half times longer than cases heard and disposed of by threejudge panels.35 Third, en bane hearings occupy all of the active
judges of the circuit with the adjudication of a single case. In the
Fifth Circuit, for example, fifteen judges will hear a single case,116
absent vacancies and visiting judges. If the court was not sitting en
bane, those judges would be availaole to sit on three-member panels
and consider simultaneously five separate cases. The burden on
judicial time is especially significant at present, for federal circuit
courts currently labor under very heavy caseloads.37 The average
number of appeals filed per judgeship in the eleven courts of appeals
supplementary briefs and oral argument. Windhurst Interview, supra note 19;
Phillips Letter, supra note 3. This is the practice in the Ninth Circuit with respect
to oral argument. Luck Letter, supra note 22.
33. Kline Letter, supra note 3.
34-. See Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to
the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARv. L REv. 542, 582-83 (1969);
Note, En Banc Hearings in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities (pt. 1), 40 N.Y.U. L. R.EV. 563, 576-77 (1965).
35. A survey was made of all cases heard by three-judge panels appearing in
volumes 454- and 455 of the Federal Reporter (2d Series) for the District of Columbia
and Second Circuits. The average time between oral argument and the filing of art
opinion in cases heard by three-judge panels was 95 days in the District of Columbia
Circuit and 50 days in the Second Circuit. The average time between initial argu•
ment and filing of the en bane opinion in twenty cases reheard en bane by the District
of Columbia Circuit between 1966 and 1972 was 533 days, or nearly 1.5 years. Five of
the twenty cases lasted over two years. In eight cases that were initially heard en bane
by this court during this time period, the average time between argument and the
filing of an opinion was 326 days. The average time between initial argument and
the filing of the en bane opinion in fifteen cases reheard en bane by the Second Cir•
cuit between 1963 and 1971 was 275 days. The court required an average of 129 days
to file an opinion in t:lvo cases that were initially heard en bane during this period.
36. See note 2 supra.
37. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, ACCOMMODATING THE 'WORKLOAD OF THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS: REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS I (1968); Carrington, supra
note 34-, at 54-3-49; Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in Judicial Administration, 42 TEXAS L. REv, 949, 979-82 (1964-).
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has tripled between 1960 and 1973.38 Several circuit reorganization
proposals have been advanced as partial solutions,39 but all circuits
seek to ease their load by making more efficient use of court time.
For example, oral argument has been drastically curtailed in some
circuits, and "the use of judgement orders and per curiam opinions
has risen dramatically."4°
Finality is also impaired by the availability of en bane rehearings.
The possibility that the decision of a three-judge panel may be overruled by an en bane court may result in routine suggestions for an
en bane hearing by the losing party.41 If a rehearing is granted,
continued litigant expense for preparation and presentation can be
expected.42
The heavy costs of the en bane procedure in terms of court time
and litigant expense should establish a strong presumption against
its use in most cases, rebuttable only by clearly demonstrable benefits.
Seen in this light, the accepted rationales for the procedure, which
not only justify the existence of the en bane power but also determine
the situations in which it should be exercised, are insufficient. Their
vagueness and overbreadth have brought about an excessive use of
the en bane procedure.
Justice Douglas's majority opinion in Textile Mills contains a
classic statement on en bane power.43 After concluding that the
language of the Judicial Code did not forbid the impaneling of
en bane courts, he stated: "Certainly, the result reached makes for
more effective judicial administration. Conflicts within a circuit will
be avoided. Finality of decision in the circuit courts of appeal will
be promoted. Those considerations are especially important in view
of the fact that in our federal judicial system these courts are the
courts of last resort in the run of ordinary cases."44 These points
38. COMMISSION ON R.EvlsION OF THE FEDERAL COURT Al>PELLATE SYSTEM, THE
GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDAlUES OF THE SEVERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUITS: REc:oMMENDATIONS FOR
CHANGE I (1973). Many cases are now decided without opinions. A list of such cases
can be found at 492 F.2d 1237-48 (1974).
39. E.g., AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, supra note 37; COMMISSION ON REvxs!ON OF
THE FEDERAL COURT .APPELLATE SYSTEM, supra note 38.
40. CoMMlSSION ON REvlsioN OF THE FEDERAL CoURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, supra note
38, at I.
41. See Note, En Banc Hearings in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities (pt. 2), 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 726, 729-30 n.246 (1965).
42. The time needed for disposition of the case is considerably lengthened, see
note 34 supra and accompanying text, and the lawyers involved in the case often file
supplementary briefs and reargue the case orally. See notes 29-32 supra and accompanying text.
43. Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326, 334-35 (1941). See also
Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. 247, 270-71 (1953) (Frankfurter.
J., concurring); Comment, The En Banc Procedures of the United States Courts of
Appeals, 21 U. Cm. L REv. 447,449 (1954).
44. 314 U.S. at 334-35.
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have been codified in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35, as
noted above.45
The first rationale-that en bane hearings resolve intra-circuit
conflict by establishing rules of law for the circuit-is based on
several assumptions. First, the rationale implies that an en bane
decision carries more precedential weight than a regular panel
decision, and that it provides the judges of the circuit with a better
guide for future reference.46 Also, the threat of a reversal upon
rehearing en bane presumably restrains a three-judge panel from
reaching a decision that is inconsistent with prior decisions of the
same circuit.41 This "restraint" theory itself assumes that en bane
rehearings are used, or may be used, to overrule aberrant panel
decisions.48
In practice, however, the power to sit en bane has not always
solved the problem of inconsistent panel decisions. 49 In a small but
not insignificant number of cases an en bane court cannot produce
a majority opinion.5° Furthermore, even a majority decision seldom
ends disagreement,51 and the host of separate opinions that an en
bane court often writes may obfuscate the court's holding,li 2 Indeed,
"[f]ailure to agree en bane may leave judges unwilling to respect the
en bane precedent strictly in subsequent panel decisions,''li 3 and the
weight of a past en bane decision or the threat of future en bane review may be ineffective against determined dissenters,li4 Accordingly,
45. See text following note 16 supra.
46. See Maris, supra note 5, at 96; Note, supra note 34, at 583. Courts often note
that a decision was decided en bane when relying on it for authority. E.g., LaShine v.
United States, 374 F.2d 285, 290 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United States v. H.N. White &:
Co., 359 F.2d 703, 711 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 358 F.2d
239, 247-48 n.4 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 982 (1966); Dykes v. United States, 343
F.2d 337, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
47. See Carrington, supra note 34, at 581; Maris, supra note 5, at 96.
48. "[D]eterminations by the courts of appeals in bane ••• enable the court to main•
tain its integrity as an institution by making it possible for a majority of judges always to control and thereby to secure uniformity and continuity in its decisions••••
Without the procedure in bane it would be possible for different panels of the court
to reach and apply in individual cases diametrically opposite conclusions upon
important questions of law or practice." Maris, supra note 5, at 96. See also Eisen v.
Carlisle&: Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1025 (2d Cir. 1973) (Oakes, J., dissenting), revd. on
other grounds, 42 U.S.L.W. 4804 (U.S. May 28, 1974).
In the Third Circuit only an en bane decision may overrule a prior panel decision,
3d Cir. Internal Operating P, § M (rev. March 1, 1974).
49. See Carrington, supra note 34, at 583; Note, supra note 34, at 583.
50. See, e.g., Frady v. United States, 348 F.2d 84 (D.C. Cir. 1965). An appreciable
number of cases have produced an equally divided court. See, e.g., Ramsey v. United
Mine Workers, 416 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1969), revd., 401 U.S. 302 (1971); Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School Dist., 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir. 1967), revd,, 393
U.S. 503 (1969); Allegheny Corp. v. Kirby, 340 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1965).
51. See Note, supra note 34, at 583.
52. Id. at 583-84.
53. Id. at 583. See also Carrington, supra note 34, at 583 n.187.
54. For example, in Whalem v. United States, 346 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied,
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many judges list intra-circuit consistency as merely a secondary
rationale for the use of en bane power.65 Judge John Brown of the
Fifth Circuit supports this view and notes that since 1968 only
three of forty-six en bane hearings in his circuit involved outright
conflicts among prior panels, and only another four or five involved
possible conflicts.56 Further evidence of judicial dissatisfaction with
the en bane procedure as a remedy for intra-circuit inconsistency is
found in Judge Mansfield's concurring opinion in Eisen v. Carlisle
b ]acquelin,51 in which he stated: "If the recent history of en bane
proceedings in this Court is any indication, ... an en bane hearing
would result in opinions expressing diverse views, necessitating ultimate resolution by the Supreme Court."58 Mansfield echoed this view
382 U.S. 862 (1965), the court on rehearing held by a vote of 6-2 that a trial judge may
proceed to trial on the basis of a hospital report certifying that an accused is competent to stand trial, if the government or the accused fails to make a timely objection.
Judges Bazelon and Wright argued that the trial judge had abused his discretion by
not ordering an independent judicial hearing to determine competency. 346 F.2d at
819 (Bazelon &: Wright, JJ., dissenting). In Hansford v. United States, 365 F.2d 920
(D.C. Cir. 1966), Judges Bazelon and Wright formed a panel majority and reversed
a trial judge's decision not to hold an independent competency hearing. The decision
is difficult to justify in light of Whalem. Judge Danaher dissented, arguing that the
decision was contrary to the precedent established for the circuit by Whalem. 365
F.2d at 926-31. Two years later, in Green v. United States, 389 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
(en bane), the court reaffirmed Whalem. Judges Bazelon and Wright again dissented.
389 F.2d at 955. See also Note, supra note 34, at 583 n.122.
55. Sixteen of eighteen judges who responded to a written request for information
ranked the "exceptionally important" justification as the most important criterion for
determining whether a case should be reheard en bane. See, e.g., Letter from Hon. Carl
McGowan, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, to the
Michigan lAw Review, Oct. 10, 1973 [hereinafter McGowan Letter]; Seitz Letter, supra
note 24; Letter from·Hon. John Paul Stevens, United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, to the Michigan Law Review, Oct. 5, 1973 [hereinafter Stevens Letter];
Swygert Letter, supra note 21. Only two judges felt that preserving intra-circuit
consistency was the principal reason for exercising the en bane power. See Letter from
Hon. H. Emory Widener, Jr., United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
to the Michigan lAw Review, Oct. 9, 1973 [hereinafter Widener Letter]; Letter from
Hon. Thomas E. Fairchild, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
to the Michigan lAw Review, Nov. 26, 1973. However, nine judges felt that preserving
intra-circuit consistency was the second most important consideration. See, e.g., Letter
from Hon. George E. MacKinnon, United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, to the Michigan lAw Review, Oct. 9, 1973; Butzner Letter, supra note 24;
Letter from Hon. Homer Thornberry, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, to the Michigan lAw Review, Dec. 4, 1973. Seven judges listed intra-circuit
uniformity as less important than at least two other factors. See, e.g., McGowan Letter,
supra; Letter from Hon. John C. Godbold, United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, to the Michigan Law Review, Oct. 29, 1973 [hereinafter Godbold Letter];
Letter from Hon. Roger J. Kiley, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, to the Michigan lAw Review, Oct. 25, 1973 [hereinafter Kiley Letter].
56. Brown Statement, supra note 3.
57. 479 F.2d 1005, 1021 (2d Cir. 1973), revd. on other grounds, 42 U.S.L.W. 4804
(U.S. May 28, 1974).
58. 479 F.2d at 1021.
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in Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre,59 stating that an en bane hearing
would not effect a binding precedent for the circuit in other cases
because of the vagueness of the standards controlling the case and
because "our views would be expressed by a divided court." 00
The second commonly stated justification for en bane hearings or
rehearings is the desirability of having all the judges of a circuit
participate in a case of "exceptional importance.'' 61 Heavy workloads
do not permit en bane consideration of all cases that provoke disagreement. Therefore, judges do not normally vote for en bane hearings each time they disagree or are likely to disagree with a panel
decision. Only those controversial cases that are thought to deserve
special consideration are heard en bane.
One obvious problem with such a criterion is that the bulk of
cases defy rigid classification; each judge has a different conception
of an "exceptionally important question." 62 Evaluation of a case as
exceptionally important is often intuitive,63 and it is difficult, if not
impossible, to predict which cases will be considered exceptionally
important by a majority of judges sitting on a court of appeals.
Nevertheless, three notions apparently underlie the "exceptional
importance" rationale. First, the participation of the entire complement of circuit judges is said to enhance the process of adjudication.
A larger number of judges may be more likely to "represent a sound
consensus about the values expressed in national law" 64-in other
words, more minds are better. 65 Second, a sitting en bane adds to the
authority of the resultant decision by eliminating the possibility that
a fortuitous composition of the panel determined the result. 00 Third,
59. 476 F.2d 806, 828 (2d Cir. 1973) (Mansfield, J., concurring), revd, on other
grounds, 42 U.S.L.W, 4475 (U.S. April 1, 1974).
60. 476 F.2d at 828.
61. See note 55 supra.
62. Examples of what judges consider to be exceptionally important questions arc:
change of an established rule of law, Widener Letter, supra note 55; novel substantive
constitutional issues, Seitz Letter, supra note 24; Cummings Letter, supra note 25;
novel criminal and civil rights cases, Letter from Hon. J. Braxton Craven, United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, to the Michigan Law Review, Oct. 12,
1973 [hereinafter Craven Letter]; constitutional issues involving civil liberties, Swygert
Letter, supra note 21; and unusual applications of constitutional law and federal-state
relationships. Kiley Letter, supra note 55.
63. Most of the judges who responded to a written inquiry used subjective modifying words such as "novel" or "unusual" to explain their examples. See note 62 supra,
64. Carrington, supra note 34, at 562.
65. "Hearings en bane may be a resort also in cases extraordinary in scale-either
because the amount involved is stupendous or because the issues are intricate enough
to invoke the pooled wisdom of the circuit." Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac.
R.R., 345 U.S. 247, 271 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (emphasis added),
66. See Goldman, Conflict and Consensus in the United States Courts of Appeals,
1968 WIS. L R.Ev. 461. The author suggests that voting blocks can be identified
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en bane consideration of exceptional cases allows all of the judges to
participate in cases of significant public interest and exposure.67
Institutional harmony may be advanced by permitting judges to
participate in important cases about which they have strong feelings.
The first notion has inherent limitations. There is an upper
limit-upon which judges do -not agree68-on the number who can
function effectively as one court.69 Beyond some point the quality
of debate may suffer and the decision-making process may become
unwieldy. Moreover, it has not been possible to correlate a higher
quality of decisions with a larger number of decision-makers.70
The second aspect of the "exceptionally important" rationalethat en bane decisions will be more authoritative-has two components. First, in cases involving sensitive political issues71 or the
on many courts of appeals, and he concludes that "an element of justice-by-lottery is
inherent in the three member panel device." Id. at 481.
67. "The Circuit Judges of the Third Circuit think that ••• [the en bane] procedure
has been very helpful in maintaining the very high esprit de corps which they enjoy.
For each of them knows that in any case in which they are seriously divided in opinion
they will all have an opportunity to participate in the ultimate decision which the
court is to make and which under the doctrine of stare decisis is to be binding on
them in future cases." Maris, supra note 5, at 96-97.
Dissatisfaction with not being allowed to participate in what a judge considers to be
a significant decision can perhaps be detected in two cases. In Armstrong v. Board of
Educ., 323 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1963) (Cameron, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 908
(1964), Judge Cameron charged that panel assignments in civil rights cases were manipulated so that the results would generally agree with the views of a four-judge
minority of the court. 323 F.2d at 359. In Eisen v. Carlisle 8: Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005
(2d Cir. 1973), Tevd. on other grounds, 42 U.S.L.W. 4804 (U.S. May 28, 1974), Judge
Oakes, after emphasizing the "extreme importance" of the case, 479 F.2d at 1022 (Oakes,
J., dissenting), stated: "Never to use the en bane procedure would tend to fragment a
court of 14 or 15 judges into panels of three, enabling a given panel-which sometimes
consists of judges not appointed to the particular circuit court-to determine cases
for the whole court." 479 F.2d at 1025.
·
68. Of fourteen circuit judges who responded to a question on the upper limit
of participation on an en bane court, seven felt that nine judges was the maximum.
E.g., Wilkey Letter, supra note 21; Craven Letter, supra note 62; Lay Letter, supra
note 25. Two judges felt that eleven was the maximum. Seitz Letter, supra-note 24;
Stevens Letter, supra note 55. Two judges felt that fifteen was the maximum. Dyer
Letter, supra note 25; Simpson Letter, supra note 21. One judge felt that seven was
the maximum. Letter from Tenth Circuit Judge to the Michigan Law Review, Oct. 2,
1973 (name withheld by request). One judge felt that ten was the maximum. Godbold
Letter, supra note 55.
69. See Carrington, supra note 34, at 584.
'10. "[T]he process of deciding the competing goals of the process, the culmination
in an opinion, and the most telling procedures in regard to each of these differ not
at all whether the bench be made up of three or nine, whether it be a panel or a
division or a whole court." K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING
APPEALS 313 (1960).
'11. See, e.g., Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1973) (en bane), Tevd., 42
U.S.L.W. 5249 (U.S. July 25, 1974) (the Detroit busing case); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d
700 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en bane); United States v. Washington Post Co., 446 F.2d 1327
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (en bane), afjd., 403 U.S. 713 (1971); United States v. New York Times,
444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.) (en bane), revd., 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Alexander v. United States,
173 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1949) (en bane), revd, on rehearing, 181 F.2d 480 (1950) (en bane).
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integrity of the judicial process72 the court may desire that its decision be as "official" and as widely acceptable as possible. Although
some fortuity in result due to the chance composition of panels is
accepted as inevitable in most cases,78 "justice-by-lottery"74 is patently
unacceptable in cases that arouse deep public emotion or impugn
the integrity of a branch of government. Second, in cases that will
significantly affect many future decisions by determining major
doctrinal trends-so-called "leading cases"-the court may seek an
en bane hearing to reduce the risk that an aberrant panel decision
will bind the full circuit to an unfortunate position. This argument
may reflect the increasing law-making function of the federal circuit
courts, which, due to the tremendous increase in judicial business,
now perform a good deal of the national law-making that in earlier
times would have been undertaken by the Supreme Court.711 In
practical terms the courts of appeals are often national courts of
last resort. 76
These arguments assume that three-judge panels, in certain cases,
have less ability than a court sitting en bane to issue legitimate,
binding, and popularly acceptable decisions. However, panel decisions have been accepted as fully binding authorities since the
creation of the courts of appeals. 77 It is hard to see why certain cases,
usually singled out by judicial whim, would lack the necessary authority if decided by panels. Furthermore, as noted above,78 en bane
hearings do not necessarily result in definitive rulings. There are
thus no compelling reasons to believe that en bane hearings more
72. See, e.g., General Tire &: Rubber Co. v. Watkins, 373 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1967)
(en bane) (writ of mandamus to compel a district judge to transfer a case to another
court); Texaco, Inc. v. Chandler, 354 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
936 (1966) (a district judge forced to withdraw from a case because of his relationship
with attorney representing a party).
73. See Goldman, supra note 66, at 434; Comment, supra note 43, at 449 n,12,
74. See note 66 supra.
75. See Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, 57
F.RD. 573 (1972). The study group concluded that the decline in the percentage of
petitions for certiorari granted during the past three decades "seem[s] to reflect, not a
lessening of the proportion of cases worthy of review, but rather the need to keep the
number of cases argued and decided on the merits within manageable limits as the
docket increases." Id. at 580. Many circuit court decisions have significantly affected
national jurisprudence. E.g., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir, 1972)
(en bane); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
76. "[I]n our federal judicial system [the courts of appeals] • , • are the courts of last
resort in the run of ordinary cases." Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S.
326, 335 (1941). See also P. Carrington, United States Civil Appeals, Report to the
Administrative Conference of the United States 5, Feb. 28, 1973.
77. See Carrington, supra note 34, at 581; Comment, supra note 43, at 448 n,3, 450.
The en bane procedure is a relatively recent innovation, The procedure was not
officially approved by the Supreme Court until Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner,
314 U.S. 326 (1941).
78. {lee text accompanying notes 49.59 supra.
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authoritatively resolve sens1t1ve issues or more correctly dictate
major doctrinal trends than three-judge panels.
The final justification for the "exceptionally important" rationale
-judicial harmony-deserves little comment. A judge's desire to
express his views on cases of public notoriety or import does not
justify spending the increased time and expense that en bane hearings necessitate.
The two rationales traditionally offered to support the use of the
en bane power and to establish criteria for the selection of cases for
full court review are thus of questionable value. Nevertheless, the
en bane decisional format may prove useful in selected cases. Methods of reforming the procedure to limit its inefficiency may take two
directions. First, the costs of en bane review-the increases in court
time spent on individual cases and in expense to litigants-can be
reduced by procedural modifications. Second, criteria for the exercise
of en bane power can be developed to limit the use of the procedure
to cases that offer tangible returns for the court time expended.
Three circuit courts, apparently cognizant of the costs entailed
by en bane review, have formally adopted procedures to limit its
use. The Ninth Circuit uses an informal screening device: If the
three-judge panel that is hearing or has heard the case decides (either
sua sponte or in response to a suggestion by a party or by a member
of the court) that review en bane is not appropriate, other members
0£ the court may acquiesce in that determination without conducting
a poll of the entire court.79 This procedure reduces the number of
judges participating in the decision to grant review and thereby
lowers the fixed cost of maintaining the en bane option. If a judge
disagrees with the panel's recommendation, however, he may still
request a vote of the entire court.80 The effectiveness of the screening device is thus speculative; it depends on the deference afforded
the panel's determinations by the other circuit judges.
A recently adopted rule in the Third Circuit requires that a
petitioner for a rehearing en bane file a statement documenting the
possibility of a significant intra-circuit conflict or noting the issue
of exceptional importance that justifies en bane consideration.81 The
rule should make it easier for the court to identify clearly unmeritorious petitions.82 It should be noted, however, that it applies only to
petitions. Judges are not required to respond to the requests with
written opinions.
79, In Banc Hearings, supra note 18, §§ 4-5.
80. Id.§ 5.
81. 3d Cm. R. 22.
82. Written litigant petitions serve functions very similar to those served by party
pleadings. Pleadings provide the court with sufficient information quickly to dispose
of unmeritorious claims. C. WRIGIIT, HANDBOOK OF THE I.Aw OF FEDERAL COURTS 283 (2d
ed.1970).
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Neither proposal attempts to redefine the criteria for the decision
to invoke the power to sit en bane. The Second Circuit, however, has
sought to amend the traditional justifications. The court declined
to sit en bane in Eisen v. Carlisle b ]acquelin 83 because of the likelihood that the Supreme Court would grant certiorari.84 In effect, the
court reversed the "exceptional importance" rationale by citing the
importance of the case as a ground for denying a rehearing en banc.8G
It stated that a rehearing would merely delay consideration by the
Supreme Court and unnecessarily burden the court of appeals.86
Although the Supreme Court did ultimately decide the case,87 the
majority's technique prompted a vigorous dissent that noted the
danger of speculation about the likelihood of certiorari in a given
case.88 Under the current assumption that en bane courts are justifiable in cases of exceptional importance, it seems unwise to base a
decision on en bane review on an assessment of certiorari potential.
If the court guesses incorrectly, it will have foreclosed review of
exactly the type of case that deserves en bane treatment under
prevailing theory. Furthermore, the workability of the "certiorari
potential" criterion depends on the exercise of judicial self-restraint
on a case-by-case basis. Such open-ended criteria have proved inadequate to limit sufficiently en bane review.
On balance, the efforts of the three circuits are notable but not
very promising: The effect of the Ninth Circuit's screening device is
83. 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), revd. on other grounds, 42 U.S.L.W. 4804 (U.S.
May 28, 1974).
84. This approach had been hinted at in earlier opinions. See, e.g., .Doraas v,
Village of .Delle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 826 (2d Cir. 1973), revd, on other grounds, 42
U.SL.W. 4475 (U.S. April 1, 1974). There is evidence that the practice is followed
informally in other circuits. See, e.g., United States v• .Bland, 472 F.2d 1329, 1850 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (McGowan & Leventhal, JJ., concurring) (denial of en bane rehearing},
85. Judge Kaufman, writing for the majority, felt that the exception did not subvert
the "exceptional importance" doctrine:
Our decision to decline en bane consideration of this case in no way implies •••
the demise of en bane in future cases of exceptional importance; nor does it
threaten to tum this collegial court into a fragmented judicial body of panels of
three, in which each panel's opinions speak only for the panel, and not for the
whole Court. Instead, we wisely speed this case on its way to the Supreme Court
as an exercise of sound, prudent and resourceful judicial administration.
479 F.2d at 1021. Despite this assertion, all cases that are significant enough to com•
mand Supreme Court review would seemingly be "exceptionally important." In denying those cases en bane treatment the court is framing a very broad exception,
86. 479 F.2d at 1021.
87. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 42 U.S.L.W. 4804 (U.S. May 28, 1974).
88. It is said or suggested that this case is so important that it will surely result
in a grant of certiorari. With all respect I do not know how we can be so prescient
about the United States Supreme Court. It may decide that it wants to hear from
other circuits, and have a more balanced view before it than what is now the
Second's, before it grants the all powerful writ. The Court may decide that it
prefers to postpone the issue until another day, for reasons of internal administra•
tion or external policy.
479 F.2d at 1026 (Oakes, J. dissenting).
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at best speculative; the Third Circuit's requirement that litigent
petitions be in -writing is a meager advancement; and the certiorari
potential criterion of the Second Circuit is substantively inconsistent
and effectively unenforceable. Additional means of limiting en bane
hearings and rehearings to appropriate cases must be considered.
The fixed cost of the en bane procedure-the spending of an
inordinate amount of judicial time on a single case--can best be
reduced by eliminating litigant petitions and instituting rigid panel
screening.
Litigant petitions provide little benefit for their drain on court
time. In some circuits it has become common practice for the losing
party to file a petition for a rehearing en banc,89 seemingly without
regard for the directive of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
35(a) that en bane rehearings be reserved for exceptionally important
cases and intra-circuit conflicts. The petitions are rarely granted,90
and often the court does not even vote on the issue.91 Whether or not
there is a vote, however, the judges must spend time considering the
petitions.92 They are faced with an unnecessary dilemma: They must
either consider the petitions in detail, which is an unwise expenditure
of energy in light of the small number of petitions granted, or give
them only pro forma review,93 which effectively renders meaningless
the right to petition for en bane consideration.94
Elimination of litigant petitions would require an affirmative
89. Note, supra note 41, at 729-30 n.246.
90. In the District of Columbia Circuit 135 litigant requests for en bane review were filed in fiscal year 1973. Only 1 rehearing and 2 hearings en bane were granted. Kline
Letter, supra note 3. In the Seventh Circuit, 40 litigant petitions were filed during the
1969 term; only 3 rehearings en bane were granted. Of 52 petitions in the 1970 term
none were granted; of 70 petitions in the 1971 term 3 were granted; and of 94 petitions
in the 1972 term 5 were granted. Swygert Letter, supra note 21.
91. For example, 40 litigant petitions produced only 10 votes in the 1969 term of
the Seventh Circuit. Ten votes were taken out of 52 petitions in the 1970 term; 10 votes
were taken out of 70 petitions in the 1971 term; and 11 votes were taken out of 94
petitions in the 1972 term. Swygert Letter, supra note 21.
92. A litigant request for an en bane court is circulated among all of the active
judges of the circuit, who must determine whether to ask for a vote on the request.
See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra. Consideration of the request may involve
reading briefs, the final or tentative opinion of the three-judge panel, and intracircuit memoranda. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
93. See Note, supra note 41, at 732. '
94. The case for elimination of petitions for en bane hearings may be less compelling than that for eliminating petitions for en bane rehearings. En bane hearings
are seldom held. "During my tenure on the court there has been no case initially
heard by the court in bane, and I can recall only one such suggestion." Phillips Letter,
supra note 3. See also Swygert Letter, supra note 21 (only five votes on en bane hearings,
with one passing, held in the Seventh Circuit between 1969 and 1973); Kline Letter,
supra note 3 (only two hearings held en bane in the D.C. Circuit during fiscal year
1973). Litigants rarely petition for initial hearings en bane. For example, in the Seventh
Circuit there were no litigant requests for en bane hearings between September 1,
1969, and August 31, 1973. Only one litigant requested a hearing en bane in the Ninth
Circuit during fiscal year 1973. Luck Letter, supra note 22, at 93.
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change in the law. Either appropriate legislation must be passed by
Congress95 or the Supreme Court must be convinced to alter its
decision in Western Pacific Railroad Corp. v. Western Pacific Railroad,96 which requires that litigants' "suggestions" be heard. 91
A second method of minimizing the judicial energy spent on
deciding whether to grant en bane review would be to establish
a rigid panel screening procedure. Judges on the panel could, therefore, foreclose a vote on the grant of review. 98 Final authority to
order exercise of the en bane power, however, would remain with
the entire court. The proposal would vest more authority in the
panel than does the current procedure of the Ninth Circuit because
it would not allow another judge on the circuit to overrule the panel's
decision to forego a vote.99 Allowing the panel to perform this screening would free the other judges from the task of familiarizing themselves with each case in order to determine if a vote would be proper.
Moreover, there is no evidence that decisional quality would suffer.
In fact, decisions to deny en bane review may be better founded
when made only by judges who, by virtue of their participation on
the panel, are familiar with the merits of the case.
The elimination of litigant petitions and the establishment of a
panel screening procedure would conserve judicial time and energy.
Neither proposal presupposes a change in the substantive criteria for
the decision to convene en bane. However, as discussed above,100 the
traditional criteria of "intra-circuit conflict" and "exceptional importance" are too liberal in light of the burgeoning caseloads of the
appellate courts. It may be more profitable to reserve en bane treatment for those rare conflicts that involve the integrity of the judicial
process. Cases that have dramatic political repercussions,101 and
perhaps cases involving professional discipline,192 must be free from
95. U.S. CoNsr. art. III, § I, gives Congress the power to promulgate rules for the
courts of appeals: "The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish."
96. 345 U.S. 247 (1953).
97. The Supreme Court could also eliminate litigant petitions by promulgating an
amendment to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See note 15 supra.
98. The Supreme Court approved of such a scheme in dictum in Western Pacific:
"The manner in which [en bane] power is to be administered is left to the court
itself. A majority may choose to abide by the decision of the division by entrusting
the initiation of a hearing or rehearing en bane to the three judges who are selected
to hear the case." 345 U.S. at 259.
99. See text accompanying notes 79-80 supra. However, this procedure would
give the panel less authority than a discontinued Eighth Circuit practice that gave
the original panel the final authority to grant or deny requests for en bane proceedings. See Comment, supra note 43, at 453.
100. See text accompanying notes 33-42, 46-54, 61-78 supra.
101. See cases cited note 'll supra.
102. See, e.g., In re Ewers, 379 F.2d 474 (D.C. Cir, 1966) (en bane).
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claims of arbitrariness based on the constituency of the particular
panel. En bane hearing-s, if restricted to these cases, will be few in
number.
Ultimately, however, the success of any efforts to limit the use
of the en bane procedure must rely on the reasoned self-restraint of
the circuit judges. Two procedural devices may contribute to decisional rationality in this area. First, it may be useful to require a
larger degree of consensus among circuit judges before en bane
review will be ordered. Instead of the majority vote presently required under 28 U.S.C. § 46(c), Congress could require an affirmative
vote of tw-o thirds. This would ensure that only the few cases that
clearly merit consideration by the full court would receive it. Second,
courts should be encouraged or required to state the grounds on
which a case is granted en bane treatment. Explication would foster
the development of a consistent body of principles and enhance the
ability of the courts to evaluate the worth of the en bane procedure
and to determine the situations in which it is appropriate. Written
opinions would develop circuit court consistency and expertise on
the en bane question by expanding the pool of information from
informal personal knowledge to historical and inter-circuit experience. Written opinions in general add considerable rationality, continuity, and legitimacy to the decision-making process.103 Also,
forcing litigants to submit written justifications for their petitions
for en bane review (assuming such petitions continue to be allowed),
as is the practice in the Second Circuit, makes little sense unless a
body of principles has been developed that can provide a suitable
basis for the litigant's arguments. If no adequate principles emerge,
and if procedural devices to limit the heavy costs of en bane review
are not implemented, then perhaps the en bane procedure should
be eliminated.
103. The deciding is, in the main, done under felt pressure or even compulsion
to follow up with a published "opinion" which tells any interested person what the
cause is and why the decision-under the authorities-is right, and perhaps why
it is wise•
• • • [T]he opinion serves as a steadying factor which aids reckonability. Its
preparation affords not only back-check and cross-check on any contemplated
decision by way of continuity with the law to date but provides also a due measure of caution by way of contemplation of the effects ahead.
K. I.LEWELLYN, supra note 70, at 26.

